A major area in neuroscience is the study of how the brain processes spatial information. Neurons in the brain represent external stimuli via neural codes. These codes often arise from regions of space called receptive fields: each neuron fires at a high rate precisely when the animal is in the corresponding receptive field. Much research in this area has focused on understanding what features of receptive fields can be extracted directly from a neural code. In particular, Curto, Itskov, Veliz-Cuba, and Youngs recently introduced the concept of neural ideal, which is an algebraic object that encodes the full combinatorial data of a neural code. Every neural ideal has a particular generating set, called the canonical form, that directly encodes a minimal description of the receptive field structure intrinsic to the neural code. On the other hand, for a given monomial order, any polynomial ideal is also generated by its unique (reduced) Gröbner basis with respect to that monomial order. How are these two types of generating sets -canonical forms and Gröbner bases -related? Our main result states that if the canonical form of a neural ideal is a Gröbner basis, then it is the universal Gröbner basis (that is, the union of all reduced Gröbner bases). Furthermore, we prove that this situation -when the canonical form is a Gröbner basis -occurs precisely when the universal Gröbner basis contains only pseudo-monomials (certain generalizations of monomials). Our results motivate two questions: (1) When is the canonical form a Gröbner basis? (2) When the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal is not a canonical form, what can the non-pseudo-monomial elements in the basis tell us about the receptive fields of the code? We give partial answers to both questions. Along the way, we develop a representation of pseudo-monomials as hypercubes in a Boolean lattice.
Introduction
The brain is tasked with many important functions, but one of the least understood is how it builds an understanding of the world. Stimuli in one's environment are not experienced in isolation, but in relation to other stimuli. How does the brain represent this organization? Or, to quote from Curto, Itskov, Veliz-Cuba, and Youngs, "What can be inferred about the underlying stimulus space from neural activity alone?" [6] .
To pursue this question, Curto et al. introduced algebraic objects that summarize neural-activity data, which are in the form of neural codes (0/1-vectors where 1 means the corresponding neuron is active, and 0 means silence) [6] . The neural ideal of a neural code is an ideal that contains the full combinatorial data of the code. The canonical form of a neural ideal is a generating set that is a minimal description of the stimulus space structure. Hence, the questions posed above have been investigated via the neural ideal or the canonical form [5, 6, 7, 8] . As a complement to algebraic approaches, combinatorial and topological arguments are employed in related works [4, 9, 10] .
The aim of our work is to investigate, for the first time, how the canonical form is related to other generating sets of the neural ideal, namely, its Gröbner bases. This is a natural mathematical question, and additionally the answer could improve algorithms for computing the canonical form. Indeed, among small codes, surprisingly many have canonical forms that are also Gröbner bases.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on neural ideals, canonical forms, and Gröbner bases. In Section 3, we prove our main result: if the canonical form of a neural ideal is a Gröbner basis, then it is the universal Gröbner basis (Theorem 3.1). We also prove a partial converse: if the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal contains only so-called pseudomonomials, then it is the canonical form (Theorem 3.12). Our results motivate other questions:
(1) When is the canonical form a Gröbner basis? (2) If the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal is not a canonical form, what can the non-pseudo-monomial elements in the basis tell us about the underlying stimulus space? Sections 4 and 5 provide some partial answers these questions. Finally, a discussion is in Section 6.
Background
This section introduces neural ideals and related topics, which were first defined by Curto, Itskov, Veliz-Cuba, and Youngs [6] , and recalls some basics about Gröbner bases. We use the notation [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
2.1. Neural codes and receptive fields. A neural code (also known as a combinatorial code) on n neurons is a set of binary firing patterns C ⊂ {0, 1} n , that is, a set of binary strings of neural activity. Note that neither timing nor rate of neural activity are recorded in a neural code.
An element c ∈ C of a neural code is a codeword. Equivalently, a codeword is determined by the set of neurons that fire:
Thus, the entire code is identified with a set of subsets of co-firing neurons:
In many areas of the brain, neurons are associated with receptive fields in a stimulus space. We are particularly interested in the receptive fields of place cells, which are neurons that fire in response to an animal's location. More specifically, each place cell is associated with a place field, a convex region of the animal's physical environment where the place cell has a high firing rate [11] . The discovery of place cells and related neurons (grid cells and head direction cells) won neuroscientists John O'Keefe, May Britt Moser, and Edvard Moser the 2014 Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine.
Given a collection of sets U = {U 1 , ..., U n } in a stimulus space X (here U i is the receptive field of neuron i), the receptive field code, denoted by C(U ), is:
As mentioned earlier, we often identify this code with the corresponding set of subsets of [n].
Example 2.1. Consider the sets U i in a stimulus space X depicted in Figure 1 . The corresponding receptive field code is C(U ) = {∅, 1, 123, 13, 3}.
The neural ideal and its canonical form.
where σ, τ ⊆ [n] with σ ∩ τ = ∅. Note that every term in a pseudo-monomial f = i∈σ x i j∈τ (1 + x j ) divides its highest-degree term, i∈σ∪τ x i . We will use this fact several times in this work.
Each v ∈ {0, 1} n defines a pseudo-monomial ρ v as follows:
Notice that ρ v is the characteristic function for v, that is, ρ v (x) = 1 if and only if x = v.
Receptive fields U i for which the code is C(U ) = {∅, 1, 123, 13, 3}.
. , x n ] generated by all ρ v for v ∈ C:
It follows that the variety of the neural ideal is the code itself: V (J C ) = C. The following lemma provides the algebraic version of the previous statement: Algorithms for computing the canonical form were given in [6, 7, 12] . In particular, [12] describes an iterative method to compute the canonical form that is significantly more efficient than the original method presented in [6] .
The canonical form CF(J C ) is a particular generating set for the neural ideal J C [6] . The main goal in this work is to compare CF(J C ) to other generating sets of J C , namely, its Gröbner bases. Example 2.5. Returning to Example 2.1, the codewords v that are not in C(U ) = {∅, 1, 123, 13, 3} are 2, 12, and 23, so the neural ideal is
We will interpret these canonical-form polynomials in Example 2.7 below.
2.3.
Receptive-field relationships. It turns out that we can interpret pseudo-monomials in J C (and thus in the canonical form) in terms of relationships among receptive fields. First we need the following notation: for any σ ⊆ [n], define:
where, by convention, the empty intersection is the entire space X. . Let X be a stimulus space, let U = {U i } n i=1 be a collection of sets in X, and consider the receptive field code C = C(U ). Then for any pair of subsets σ, τ ⊆ [n],
Thus, three types of receptive-field relationships (RF relationships) can be read off from pseudomonomials in a neural ideal (e.g., those in the canonical form) [6] :
Example 2.7. The canonical form in Example 2.5, which is {x 2 (1 + x 1 ), x 2 (1 + x 3 )}, encodes two Type 2 relationships: U 2 ⊆ U 1 and U 2 ⊆ U 3 . Indeed, we can verify this in Figure 1 .
In this work, we reveal more types of RF relationships, which arise from non-pseudo-monomials. They often appear in Gröbner bases of neural ideals (see Section 5).
Gröbner bases.
Here we recall some basics about Gröbner bases [1, 3] .
Fix a monomial ordering < of a polynomial ring R = k[x 1 , . . . , x n ] over a field k, and let I be an ideal in R. Let LT < (I) denote the ideal generated by all leading terms, with respect to the monomial ordering <, of elements in I. Definition 2.8. A Gröbner basis of I, with respect to <, is a finite subset of I whose leading terms generate LT < (I).
One useful property of a Gröbner basis is that given a polynomial f and a Gröbner basis G, the remainder of f when divided by the set of elements in G is uniquely determined.
A Gröbner basis is reduced if (1) every f ∈ G has leading coefficient 1, and (2) no term of any f ∈ G is divisible by the leading term of any g ∈ G for which g = f . For a given monomial ordering, the reduced Gröbner basis of an ideal is unique. Definition 2.9. A universal Gröbner basis of an ideal I is a Gröbner basis that is a Gröbner basis with respect to every monomial ordering. The universal Gröbner basis of an ideal I is the union of all the reduced Gröbner bases of I.
The set of all distinct reduced Gröbner bases of an ideal I is finite [1, pg. 515], so the universal Gröbner basis is an instance of a universal Gröbner basis.
Main Result
In this section, we give the main result of our paper: if the canonical form is a Gröbner basis, then it is a universal Gröbner basis (Theorem 3.1). Beyond being a natural expansion of some of Curto et al.'s results [6] , our theorem is also of mathematical interest since there are few classes of ideals whose universal Gröbner bases are known. Indeed, such characterizations in general are known to be computationally difficult.
Theorem 3.1. If the canonical form of a neural ideal J C is a Gröbner basis of J C with respect to some monomial ordering, then it is the universal Gröbner basis of J C .
The proof of Theorem 3.1, which appears in Section 3.3, requires the following related results:
, the leading term of f with respect to any monomial ordering is its highest-degree term, x σ∪τ .
Proof. This follows from the fact that every term of f divides x σ∪τ , and two properties of a monomial ordering [3] : it is a well-ordering (so, 1 < x i ), and x α < x β implies x α∪γ < x β∪γ . Proposition 3.3. If the canonical form of a neural ideal J C is a Gröbner basis of J C with respect to some monomial ordering, then it is a universal Gröbner basis of J C .
Proof. Let G denote the canonical form, and assume that G is a Gröbner basis with respect to some monomial ordering < 1 . Let < 2 denote another monomial ordering. As always, we have the containment LT < 2 (G) ⊆ LT < 2 (J C ), which we must prove is an equality. Accordingly, let f ∈ J C . We must show that LT < 2 (f ) ∈ LT < 2 (G). With respect to < 1 , the reduction of f by G is 0, so we can write f as a polynomial combination of some of the g i ∈ G in the following form:
is the remainder after the i-th division of f by G. Note that in equation (1), the polynomial g i may appear multiple times, but this does not affect our arguments. By Lemma 3.2, the leading term of g i does not depend on the monomial ordering. Moreover, each h i is the product of a monomial and a pseudo-monomial, g i , so by a straightforward generalization of Lemma 3.2, the leading term of h i with respect to any monomial ordering is LT < 1 (h i ). Also note that when dividing by the Gröbner basis G,
Hence, among the list of monomials {LT(h i )} t i=1 , there is a unique largest monomial with respect to < 2 , which we denote by LT(h i * ). Next, by examining the sum in (1), and noting that every term of h i divides the leading term of h i , we see that
Thus, if the canonical form is a Gröbner basis with respect to some monomial ordering, then it is a Gröbner basis with respect to every monomial ordering.
3.1. Pseudo-monomials and hypercubes. To prove our main result (Theorem 3.1), we need to develop the connection between pseudo-monomials and hypercubes in the Boolean lattice. The Boolean lattice on [n] is the power set P ([n]) := 2 [n] , partially ordered by inclusion.
The support of a monomial n i=1
The hypercube of f , denoted by H(f ), is the sublattice of the Boolean lattice on [n] formed by all supports of terms of f .
The hypercube of f is the interval of the Boolean lattice from σ to σ ∪ τ :
and thus its Hasse diagram is a hypercube (this justifies its name). This is because: Via hypercubes, divisibility of pseudo-monomials has a nice geometric interpretation:
For pseudo-monomials f = x σ j∈τ (1 + x j ) and g = x α j∈β (1 + x j ), the following are equivalent: The
is indicated by circles and solid lines, and P ( [2] ) is marked by dotted lines. If g is a pseudo-monomial that divides f , then its hypercube is contained in either the hypercube of f or one of the dashed-line squares "parallel" to the hypercube of f (see Example 3.8) .
To see this, we first recall:
from Remark 3.5. Thus,
where the second equality follows from hypotheses: α ⊆ σ and σ ∩ β ⊆ σ ∩ τ = ∅ (because β ⊆ τ ).
(3) ⇒ (4) is clear, so we need only show (2) ⇐ (4). Accordingly, suppose H(g) ⊆ P (σ ∪ τ ) and I := H(g) ∩ P (σ) consists of only one element. We claim that this element is α. Indeed, let ω ∈ I (i.e., ω ∈ H(g) and ω ⊆ σ); then, α also is in I (because α ∈ H(g) and α ⊆ ω ⊆ σ). So, α = ω ⊆ σ.
To complete the proof, we must show that β ⊆ τ . To this end, let k ∈ β. Then α ∪ {k} is in H(g), by equation (2), so it is not in P (σ) (because H(g) ∩ P (σ) = {α}). So, k ∈ (β \ σ). Finally, (β \ σ) ⊆ τ , because α ∪ β ⊆ σ ∪ τ follows from the hypothesis H(g) ⊆ P (σ ∪ τ ). So, k ∈ τ . 
. , x n ], and let G be a finite set of pseudo-monomials in F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x n ]. If some remainder on division of f by G is 0 for some monomial ordering, then there exists g ∈ G such that g divides f .
Proof. Suppose that some remainder on division of f by G is 0:
where, as in the proof of Proposition 3.3, for i = 1, . . . , t, we have g i ∈ G, h i := LT(r i−1 ) LT(g i ) g i , and r i = f − h 1 − · · · − h i is the remainder after the i-th division (and r 0 := f ). Also, each term of h i divides the leading term of h i .
By construction, g i |h i . So, it suffices to show that there exists i such that h i |f . We now claim that LT(h i )|LT(f ) holds for all i. We prove this claim by induction on i. For the i = 1 case, LT(h 1 ) = LT(f ). If i ≥ 2, then LT(h i ) is the leading term of:
We now examine the summands in (4) . As f is a pseudo-monomial, each term in f divides LT(f ), and the same holds for each remaining summand h i : as noted above, its terms divide LT(h i ), and thus (by induction hypothesis) divide LT(f ). So, LT(h i ) = LT(r i−1 )|LT(f ), proving our claim.
We now assert that h i is a pseudo-monomial. To see this, recall that h i is the product of a monomial and a pseudo-monomial (namely, g i ), so we just need to show that its leading term is square-free. Indeed, this follows from two facts: LT(h i )|LT(f ) and f is a pseudo-monomial.
Hence, H(h i ) ⊆ P (σ ∪ τ ) for every i, because every term in h i divides LT(h i ) which in turn divides x σ∪τ = LT(f ). Thus, by Lemma 3.7, it is enough to show that |H(h i ) ∩ P (σ)| = 1 for some i (because this would imply that h i |f ).
The sum in (3) is over F 2 , so the polynomials f, h 1 , . . . , h t together must contain an even number of each term. We focus now on only those terms with support in P (σ). The pseudo-monomial f has only one such term (namely, x σ ). Thus, some h i has an odd number of terms in P (σ), i.e., |H(h i ) ∩ P (σ)| is odd. On the other hand, both H(h i ) and P (σ) are hypercubes in the Boolean lattice, so their intersection, if nonempty, also is a hypercube and thus has size 2 q for some q ≥ 0. Hence, q = 0, so |H(h i ) ∩ P (σ)| = 1. This completes our proof. Proof. Suppose for contradiction that CF(J C ) is a Gröbner basis, but not a reduced Gröbner basis. Then there exist f, g ∈ CF(J C ), with f = g, such that LT(g) divides some term of f . Thus, LT(g) divides LT(f ) (because every term in a pseudo-monomial divides the leading term). Thus, CF(J C ) and CF(J C ) \ {f } both generate the same ideal of leading terms, and hence CF(J C ) \ {f } is also a Gröbner basis of J C . It follows that the remainder on division of f by CF(J C ) \ {f } is 0, so by Theorem 3.9, there exists h ∈ CF(J C ) \ {f } such that h|f . Hence, f is a non-minimal element of the canonical form, which is a contradiction.
Now we can prove Theorem 3.1, which states that a canonical form that is a Gröbner basis is the universal Gröbner basis:
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Follows from Propositions 3.3 and 3.10.
Every pseudo-monomial in a reduced
Gröbner basis is in the canonical form. In this subsection, we prove the following partial converse of Theorem 3.1: if the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal consists of only pseudo-monomials, then it equals the canonical form (Theorem 3.12).
We first show that every pseudo-monomial in a reduced Gröbner basis is in the canonical form. (2) Let G be the universal Gröbner basis of J C . Then every pseudo-monomial in G is in the canonical form of J C .
Proof. Let f be a pseudo-monomial in G. Suppose that f is not a minimal pseudo-monomial in J C : for some pseudo-monomial h ∈ J C such that deg(h)<deg(f ), h|f . Then for some g ∈ G, LT(g)|LT(h). Hence, LT(g)|LT(f ) (because LT(h)|LT(f )) and also g = f (because deg(g) ≤ deg(h) < deg(f )). This is a contradiction: f and g cannot both be in a reduced Gröbner basis. Finally, (2) follows directly from (1).
Here we build on Theorem 3.1: Under certain conditions, e.g. small number of neurons, computing the Gröbner basis is more efficient than computing the canonical form, but is there some way to avoid computations entirely and yet still decide whether the canonical form is a Gröbner basis? In the next section, we give conditions under which we can resolve this decision problem quickly. Indeed, the canonical form is CF(J C ) = {x 3 (x 1 + 1), x 2 + 1, (x 4 + 1)(x 1 + 1), x 4 x 1 , x 4 x 3 }, and, for a monomial ordering where x 4 > x 1 , the leading term of the non-pseudo-monomial x 1 + x 4 + 1 is x 4 , which is not divisible by any of the leading terms from the canonical form.
When is the canonical form a Gröbner basis?
In this section we present some results that partially solve the question of when is the canonical form a Gröbner basis for the neural ideal. A complete answer to this question is not only of theoretical interest but perhaps also of practical relevance. Extensive computations suggest that, under certain conditions, Gröbner bases of neural ideals can be computed more efficiently than canonical forms. This is true for small neural codes. Table 1 displays a runtime comparison between the iterative canonical form algorithm described in [12] and a specialized Gröbner basis algorithm for Boolean rings implemented in SageMath based on the work in [2] . We report the mean time (in seconds) of 100 randomly generated codes on n neurons for n = 4, . . . , 8. More precisely, for each code, a number m was chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , 2 n − 1} and then m codewords were chosen at random. These computations were performed on SageMath 7.2 running on a Macbook Pro with a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of memory. For codes on a larger number of neurons, our computations indicate that in general Gröbner bases computations are still more efficient than canonical form computations. However, even in the case of n = 9 neurons we found codes whose Gröbner bases took over 6 hours to be computed. Proof. If C = {c}, then Lemma 2.3 implies that J C = x 1 − c 1 , x 2 − c 2 , . . . , x n − c n . When |C| = 2 n − 1, then by definition J C = ρ v for the unique v / ∈ C. In either case, the indicated generating set is both the canonical form and the universal Gröbner basis of J C .
A set of subsets ∆ ⊆ 2 [n] is an (abstract) simplicial complex if σ ∈ ∆ and τ ⊆ σ implies τ ∈ ∆. A neural code C is a simplicial complex if its support supp(C) is a simplicial complex. Proof. If C is a simplicial complex, then J C is a monomial ideal generated by the minimal Type 1 relationships (indeed, it is the Stanley-Reisner ideal of the simplicial complex supp(C)) [6, Lemma 4.4] . These minimal Type-1 relationships comprise the canonical form of J C , and also form the universal Gröbner basis of J C .
The next result gives conditions that guarantee that the canonical form is not a Gröbner basis.
be a collection of sets in a stimulus space X, and let C = C(U ) denote the corresponding receptive field code. If one of the following conditions hold, then the canonical form of J C is not a Gröbner basis of J C :
(1) Two proper, nonempty receptive fields coincide: ∅ = U i = U j X for some i = j ∈ [n].
(2) Two nonempty receptive fields are complementary: U i = X \ U j for some i = j ∈ [n] with U i = ∅ and U j = ∅.
Proof. (1) Suppose U i , U j ∈ U are two sets with ∅ = U i = U j X. By Lemma 2.6, both f = x i (x j + 1) and g = x j (x i + 1) are in J C . In fact, f and g are minimal pseudo-monomials in J C (because ∅ = U i = U j = X), so f, g ∈ CF(J C ). Under any monomial ordering, LT(f ) = LT(g) = x i x j (by Lemma 3.2), so the set CF(J C ) is not reduced and thus cannot be a reduced Gröbner basis. Hence, by Proposition 3.10, CF(J C ) cannot be a Gröbner basis.
(2) Now assume that U i = X \U j for some i = j ∈ [n], with U i = ∅ and U j = ∅. Thus, U i ∩U j = ∅ and U i ∪ U j = X, so Lemma 2.6 implies that f = x i x j and g = (x i + 1)(x j + 1) are in J C . Now we proceed as in the previous paragraph: f and g are minimal pseudo-monomials in CF(J C ), and LT(f ) = LT(g) = x i x j , so, by Proposition 3.10, CF(J C ) cannot be a Gröbner basis.
The last result in this section concerns a class of codes that we call complement-complete. Proof. Note that since C = {0, 1} n , J C is not trivial. We make the following claim: Claim: If h is a pseudo-monomial in J C , then h is also in J C . To see this, let S be the set of all degree-n pseudo-monomials in F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x n ] that are multiples of h (so, S ⊆ J C ). Degree-n pseudo-monomials in F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x n ] are characteristic functions ρ v , so, every element of S is some ρ v , where v / ∈ C. Thus, every element of S := {f | f ∈ S} has the form
Next, let s ∈ S, that is, s = hq for some pseudo-monomial q. Then hq is also in S. Since gcd(q, q) = 1, it follows that h = gcd(hq, hq), so h = gcd{S}. Thus, h = gcd{S}, so h ∈ J C (because S ⊆ J C ), which proves the claim. Now let f ∈ CF (J C ). By the claim, f is in J C , and now we assert that, like f , the pseudomonomial f is in CF (J C ). Indeed, if a pseudo-monomial d in J C divides f , then by Lemma 4.7, the pseudo-monomial d divides f . Also, d ∈ J C (by the claim), so d = f (because f is minimal), and thus d = f . Hence, f is minimal, and so f is also in CF (J C ). Thus, CF (J C ) contains two polynomials (f and f ) with the same leading term, and so is not a reduced Gröbner basis, and thus (by Proposition 3.10) is not a Gröbner basis of J C . Example 4.9. Consider again the complement-complete code C = {1000, 0111, 1010, 0101} from Example 4.5. The canonical form is CF (J C ) = {(x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1), (x 1 + 1)(x 4 + 1), x 1 x 2 , x 2 (x 4 + 1), x 1 x 4 , x 4 (x 2 +1)}. Note that CF (J C ) is itself complement-complete; for example, f = x 2 (x 4 +1) and f = x 4 (x 2 + 1) are both in CF (J C ). Also, we can show directly that CF (J C ) is not a Gröbner basis, which is consistent with Proposition 4.8: with respect to any monomial ordering, the leading term of f + f = x 2 + x 4 + 1 is not divisible by any of the leading terms in CF (J C ).
New receptive-field relationships
We saw earlier that if the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal consists of only pseudomonomials, then it equals the canonical form (Theorem 3.12). When this is not the case, there are non-pseudo-monomial elements in the universal Gröbner basis, so it is natural to ask what they tell us about the receptive fields of the code. In other words, what types of RF relationships, besides those of Types 1-3 (Lemma 2.6), appear in Gröbner bases? Here we give a partial answer:
be a collection of sets in a stimulus space X. Let C = C(U ) denote the corresponding receptive field code, and let J C denote the neural ideal. Then for any subsets σ 1 , σ 2 , τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ [n], and m indices 1 ≤ i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i m ≤ n, with m ≥ 2, we have RF relationships as follows:
Type 5:
. . , m, and if, additionally, m is odd, then m k=1 U i k = ∅. Type 6:
Proof. Throughout the proof, for p ∈ X, we let c(p) denote the corresponding codeword in C. Type 4. Let f 1 := x σ 1 i∈τ 1 (1 + x i ), and let f 2 := x σ 2 j∈τ 2 (1 + x j ). Also, let W 1 := U σ 1 ∩ i∈τ 1 U c i , and let W 2 := U σ 2 ∩ j∈τ 2 U c j . By symmetry, we need only show that W 1 ⊆ W 2 . To this end, let p ∈ W 1 (so, c(p) ∈ C). First, because f 1 + f 2 ∈ J C and V (J C ) = C, it follows that f 1 (c(p)) = f 2 (c(p)). Next, for i = 1, 2, we have p ∈ W i if and only if f i (c(p)) = 1. Thus, p ∈ W 2 .
Type 5. Let g := x i 1 + ... + x im . By symmetry, we need only show that U i 1 ⊆ ∪ m l=2 U i l . To this end, let p ∈ U i 1 (so, c(p) i 1 = 1). Then g ∈ J C implies the following equality in F 2 :
Thus, for some k ≥ 2, we have c(p) i k = 1, i.e., p ∈ U i k . Hence, p ∈ ∪ m l=2 U i l . Now assume, additionally, that m is odd. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists q ∈ ∩ m k=1 U i k . Then, like the sum (5) above, we have 0 = g(c(q)) = 1 + · · · + 1 = m, which contradicts the hypothesis that m is odd. So, ∩ m k=1 U i k = ∅. Type 6. Let h := x i 1 + · · · + x im + 1. Let p ∈ X (so, c(p) ∈ C). We must show that p ∈ ∪ m k=1 U i k . Because h ∈ J C , we have 0 = h(c(p)) = c(p) i 1 + · · · + c(p) im + 1. Thus, for some k ∈ [m], we have c(p) i k = 1, i.e., p ∈ U i k . Hence, p ∈ ∪ m k=1 U i k . ) This points to one of the advantages of our new RF relationships: we can read off some set equalities more quickly than from the canonical form. Indeed, the canonical form is CF(J C ) = {x 1 (1 + x 2 ), x 2 (1 + x 1 )}, in which the Type 2 relationships are U 1 ⊆ U 2 and U 2 ⊆ U 1 -and only from there do we infer the equality U 1 = U 2 .
Discussion
In this work, we proved that if a code's canonical form is a Gröbner basis of the neural ideal, then it is the universal Gröbner basis. Additionally, we gave conditions that guarantee or preclude this situation, and found three new types of receptive-field relationships that arise in neural ideals. Going forward, there are natural extensions to pursue:
(1) Give a complete characterization of codes for which the canonical form is a Gröbner basis.
(2) Beyond those of Types 1-6, what other receptive-field relationships can be read off from a Gröbner basis, and what do they tell us about a code? Solutions to these problems would help us extract information about the stimulus space structure directly from the neural code.
Finally, we expect that our results can be used to improve canonical-form algorithms. Indeed, our experiments indicate that under certain conditions, Gröbner bases can be computed more efficiently than canonical forms. Moreover, we now know that every pseudo-monomial in the universal Gröbner basis of a neural ideal is in the canonical form -so, that subset of the canonical form can be computed efficiently. And, in the case when the universal Gröbner basis contains only pseudo-monomials, then we can conclude immediately that the basis is in fact the canonical form. Canonical-form algorithms, therefore, can be made more efficient by first computing the universal Gröbner basis and then, if necessary, proceeding to compute the canonical form.
